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Abstract
For an economy with dysfunctional intertemporal nancial markets the nancial
sector is modelled as a competitve banking sector oering deposit contracts. In a setting
similar to Allen and Gale (1998, [1]) properties of the optimal liquidity provision are
analyzed for illiquid assets with ambiguous returns.
In the context of the model, ambiguity | i.e. incalculable risk | leads to dynami-
cally inconsistent investor behaviour. If the nancial sector fails to recognize the pres-
ence of ambiguity, unanticipated fundamental crises may occur, which are incorrectly
blamed on investors `loosing their nerves' and `panicing'.
The basic mechanism of the current nancial crisis resembles a banking panic in
the presence of ambiguous asset returns. The combination of providing additional liq-
uidity and supporting distressed nancial institutions implements the regulatory policy
suggested by the model.
A credible commitment to such `bail-out policy' does not create a moral hazard prob-
lem. Rather, it implements the second best ecient outcome by discouraging excessive
caution. Reducing ambiguity by increasing stability, transparency and predictability |
as suggested by ordo-liberalism and the `Freiburger Schule' | enhances ex-ante welfare.
Keywords: Financial Intermediation, Liquidity, Ambiguity, Choquet Expected Utility,
Financial Crisis
JEL-Codes: D8, G1, G2
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1. Introduction
The nancial crisis of 2007 and 2008 re-fueled the debate on the causes of | and
regulatory responses to | asset price bubbles and the crises they may cause. Despite
unresolved issues on how to dene and identify bubbles, a range of measures to prevent
them is discussed. Under the impression of recent losses, the desirability of avoiding
inated asset prices seems to be taken for granted. Still, it is not obvious that bubbles
are bad and should be prevented. In particular, the question should be addressed if it
may be preferable to resolve crises when they occur.
As an example, consider the choice between a high technology growth strategy and
one that relies on investments in low technology. Clearly, the former strategy is more
prone to bubbles and crises than the latter. But if the dierence in growth rates is high,
crises do not occur too often, and the costs of a crisis are not too excessive, the high
technology strategy will be prefered. This is an example of `optimal nancial crises', as
e.g. in Allen and Gale (1998, [1]), Spanjers (2008a, [31]) and Spanjers (2009, [33]).
The above trade-o may seem more relevant for developing countries than for the
industrialized states from which the nancial crisis originated. Still, even for developed
countries bubbles may be the price for progress. The seeds for life-changing innovations
tend to be laid in times of nancial bubbles. Who would doubt that the benets of the
information and communication technology by far outweigh the costs of the dot.com
bubble? Given the key role of technological progress in the long term improvement
of living standards, such arguments in the spirit of Hayek (1935, [20]) deserve careful
consideration. For recent studies on the eects of bubbles on growth see e.g. Olivier
(2000, [26]) and Caballero et. al. (2006, [3]).
Rather than on preventing bubbles and crises at (almost) any cost, the discussion
should focus on how to cushion the impact of crises if and when they occur. When
comparing the Great Depression, the Japan crisis in the 1990s, and the current nancial
crisis, it is clear that the eectiveness of dealing with crises has increased dramatically.
For a discussion of the current nancial crisis see e.g. Hellwig (2008, [21]).
Hellwig (2008, [21]) provides compelling arguments for the incompleteness and im-
perfection of the nancial markets having played a key role both in triggering the crisis
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and in amplyfying its eects. It seems reasonable to assume that in normal times the
intertemporal liquidity allocation of the nancial sector of the economy can be approx-
imated by the invisible hand as in the Arrow-Debreu model. We argue that this is not
the case in times of nancial crises, when the aggregate liquidity demand diers strongly
from that anticipated by the nancial sector.
In such situations, the basic interactions in the nancial system are not about the
intra-temporal re-allocation of liquid and illiquid assets. Rather, they are about the
decision whether to continue ongoing projects or to liquidate assets at a signicant
loss. For economies characterized by dysfunctional intertemporal markets, the aggregate
institutional framework is better represented by the extreme case of an unregulated
competitive banking sector, oering deposit contracts in the tradition of Diamond and
Dybvig (1983, [7]) To capture the driving mechanism of the nancial crisis, we extend the
liquidity provision model of Eichberger and Harper (1997, [8], Chapter 7) and Spanjers
(1999/2008, [30], Chapter 3) by introducing ambiguity (i.e. incalculable risk) over the
payout structure of the illiquid asset.
Fundamental aspects of the model { e.g. the presence of ambiguity, deposit taking
institutions, and insucient levels of equity { also relate to specic instances of the
nancial crisis. In particular, they play a role in the drying up of liquidity in the inter-
bank money market during the sub-prime mortgage crisis, in the run on Northern Rock
in the United Kingdom, in the bail-out of the mortgage giants Freddie Mac and Fanny
Mae, and in the collaps of Lehman Brothers. But we maintain that the relevance of the
aggregate problems of intertemporal liquidity allocation surpass these specic instances.
Our point of departure is that each of these events was caused by an increase in
incalculable risk or, as it is referred to in the relevant literature, ambiguity. Knight (1921,
[25]) and Keynes (1937, [24]) provide an intuition for dierentiating between (calculable)
risk and (incalculable) ambiguity. We use a simple representation of ambiguity in the
tradition of Ellsberg (1961, [13]) by Eichberger and Kelsey (1999, [9]). It is integrated in
a linear model of liquidity provision with risky assets related to Jacklin and Bhattacharya
(1988, [22]) and Allen and Gale (1998, [1])
The eects of ambiguity in a nancial and monetary setting have been analyzed in a
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number of papers. For the eects on nancial markets see e.g. Dow and Werlang (1992,
[6]), Epstein and Wang (1994, [12]) and Alvarez (2009 [2]); for the eects on nancial
institutions see e.g. Spanjers (1999/2008, [30]), Eichberger and Spanjers (2008, [10])
and Spanjers (2008a, [31]). The impact of ambiguity on monetary policy has amongst
others been addressed in Hansen and Sargent (2001, [19]), Wagner (2007, [34]), Ghatak
and Spanjers (2007, [17]) and Spanjers (2008, [32]).
In our model nancial crises | which are modelled as banking panics in the nancial
sector of the economy | can be triggered by an increase in the level of ambiguity
experienced by investors. Such a loss of condence can be caused by events that are
exogenous to the model. More interestingly, the arrival of new information on the
prospects of the asset returns can lead to an endogenous loss of condence through the
updating of ambiguous beliefs. If one is not aware of the presence of ambiguity, this
endogenous loss of condence can easily be mistaken for an irrational overreaction by
investors. Spanjers (1999/2008a, [31]) shows that in a setting similar to that of the
current paper, this mechanism explains the 1997 East-Asian crisis.
As some observers noted | one of them being the President of the Bundesbank, Axel
Weber | the problems with mortgage and asset backed securities had strong similarities
with the bank runs in the theoretical models, as did the problems of hedge funds.
`The current turmoil in the nancial markets has all the characteristics
of a classic banking crisis, but one that is taking place outside the tradi-
tional banking sector, Axel Weber, president of the Bundesbank, said at the
weekend.
[...]
Some Federal Reserve policymakers also privately see comparisons be-
tween the current distress in credit markets and the bank runs of the 19th
century, in which savers lost condence in banks and demanded their money
back, creating a spiralling liquidity crisis for institutions that had invested
this money in longer-term assets.
[...]
\What we are seeing at the moment is a total overreaction," he said.
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\There is no overall problem in terms of solvency { it is one of liquidity." He
said the challenge for central banks { which cannot supply liquidity directly
to the non-bank sector { was to help banks absorb the inux of assets onto
their balance sheets.'
Financial Times, 2nd September 2007
We use our theoretical model to propose and evaluate policy measures. One pos-
sibility is to prevent nancial crises by requiring that `prudential' low-risk investment
strategies are pursued. An alternative measure is for the public sector to underwrite
`toxic assets' to counteract the loss of condence.
The results of our analysis are revealing. The eectiveness of requiring the nancial
sector to `prudentially' follow low-risk investment strategies is less clear than may be
expected. Like the nancial system, our model is driven by indiversiable systematic
risk. Any regulation that reduces this indiversiable risk must by its very nature aect
the aggregate state contingent returns on investment.
The investment decisions in our model involve a choice between a low yielding liquid
asset and an illiquid asset which provides a high yield when it matures, but which incurs
a loss in the case of premature liquidation. The latter occurs in a nancial crisis. If
the anticipated return on the illiquid asset is suciently higher than that of the liquid
asset; if the costs of liquidation are low; and/or the occurrence of a crisis is unlikely,
the benets of the higher returns outweigh the losses incurred in the occasional crisis.
Under such circumstances, any regulation causing the nancial sector to `prudentially'
follow less risky investment strategies damages the long run prospects of the economy.
Considering the underwriting of `toxic assets' by the public sector, we nd that this
is an eective policy measure which removes the distortive eects of the presence of
ambiguity. Furthermore, the direct cost of underwriting only reects the amount of risk
that is insured, whereas its main impact is through the costless (and priceless) insurance
of the unfounded fear caused by the presence of ambiguity.
An often-mentioned concern regarding the underwriting of toxic assets is that it
creates a moral hazard problem, reducing nancial institutions' incentives to follow
prudent investment strategies. If the policy is anticipated, it is claimed to encourage
Liquidity Provision, Ambiguous Asset Returns and the Financial Crisis 7
overly risky investment decisions in the anticipation of being bailed out in a crisis. This
argument does not apply for the model of this paper.
On the contrary, for the range of parameter values we consider, it is the potential
loss due to the premature liquidation of illiquid assets that distorts incentives. These
liquidation losses make nancial institutions follow overly cautious investment strategies.
As a result, the overall investment strategy is not as protable as it could have been
given the information constraints, i.e. the outcomes fails to be second best ecient.
The anticipation and implementation of a bail-out policy when a crisis occurs corrects
these distorted incentives, thus removing a moral hazard problem, rather than creating
one.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
model. The second best ecient liquidity allocation is determined in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 analyzes the liquidity provision by an unregulated nancial sector. In Section
5 regulatory measures are discussed and Section 6 addresses the impact of a failure to
recognize the presence of ambiguity. Concluding remarks are made in Section 7: These
remarks relate to dynamic inconsistency in updating ambiguous beliefs and provide
policy recommendations.
2. The Basic Model
We consider a simplied linear model in the spirit of Diamand and Dybvig (1983, [7])
and Jacklin and Battacharya (1988, [22]). Investors contribute initial wealth in pooled
investment vehicles (`banks') that choose between investing in a riskless liquid low yield
asset and a risky illiquid asset with a high expected return. After one period, investors
obtain two signals: a public signal regarding the perspectives of the risky asset and
a private signal regarding their own immediate liquidity needs. On the basis of this
information they decide whether or not to withdraw their initial contributions. If too
many investors withdraw their contributions, illiquid assets will be liquidated and a
`banking panic' (i.e. a nancial crisis) occurs.
The model diers from the usual setting in an important way. In our formulation
investors' immediate liquidity needs are the basis for the withdrawal of funds, whereas in
the setting of Diamond and Dybvig (1983, [7]) withdrawals are caused by an increase in
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the individual probability of not surviving to enjoy the future high returns of the illiquid
assets. In terms of investors' preferences, this changed setting leads to a qualitatively
dierent ex-ante expected utility function.
Although the original Diamond-Dybvig setting is excellently suited to address issues
surrounding the design and analysis of pension funds and dierent systems of pension
provision, we maintain it is less suited for the analysis of the recent nancial crisis, which
was driven by more immediate liquidity needs, rather than long term considerations.
2.1. Investment opportunities. The 3-period economy of our model consists of a
continuum I := [0; 1] of ex-ante identical investors who at t = 0 each have one unit of
wealth. The economy oers two investment opportunities: a riskless liquid zero-yield
asset called money and an illiquid asset which provides a high return when it matures
and is successful, but leads to a severe loss when it matures and fails to be successful. In
the period after investment decisions have been made, investors obtain a public signal
regarding the prospects of the risky illiquid asset and a private signal regarding their
individual liquidity needs. If they decide to prematurely liquidate their illiquid asset
after receiving the signal, the severe loss can be prevented, but the initial investment
will not be recovered in full.
The following table states the pay-outs of the investments.
Investment Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 Success Period 2 Failure
Money 0 to 1  1 1 0 0
Money 1 to 2 0  1 1 1
Investment matured  1 0 h `
Investment liquidated  1 1 0 0
The probabilities associated with the public signal regarding the prospects of the illiquid
asset are as in the table below. It is assumed that the investments carry no idiosyncratic
risk. All risk related to their payouts is non-diversiable systematic risk. The signal
 2 fb; gg at t = 1 can be interpreted as a forecast of the economy's prospects, the
return % 2 fh; `g as the actual economic development.
Signal  Payout % Probability %
b h 
b ` "
g h 1  ( + ")
g ` 0
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The timing of the decisions of the investors is as follows:
Period 0 Investment decisions
Period 1 Individual liquidity preference  2 fH;Lg becomes privately known
Signal  2 fb; gg becomes publicly known
Possibility for liquidation of assets
Consumption in Period 1
Period 2 Return % 2 fh; `g occurs
Consumption in Period 2
2.2. Beliefs. The investors face uncertainty over their individual liquidity preference
and over the combinations of signals and asset returns. This uncertainty is partly in the
form of calculable risk and partly in the form of incalculable ambiguity.
In particular, the investors face ex-ante risk with respect to their individual liquidity
preference, which is either high (H) or low (L) and which is represented by  2 fH;Lg.
The liquidity type of the investors is assumed to be independent of the asset state
(; %) 2 fb; gg  fh; `g. In addition to risk about their liquidity type, investors face
ambiguity over the combinations of signals { good (g) or bad (b) { and asset returns {
high (h) and low (`) { that may arise.
Investors' uncertainty is over their individual state space fH;Lg  fb; gg  fh; `g.
In the face of this uncertainty, their decisions will be guided by their beliefs over these
combinations of potential outcomes. In particular, we assume investors' beliefs over
fH;Lg  fb; gg  fh; `g to be represented by an E-capacity (; fFg2fH;Lg; ) which
consist of:
 an additive probability distribution ;
 a level of condence  2 [0; 1] in ;
 an additive partition of the state space with components
FH := f(H; b; h); (H; b; `); (H; g; h); (H; g; `)g and
FL := f(L; b; h); (L; b; `); (L; g; h); (L; g; `)g:
The interpretation of these beliefs is as follows. Each investor has a conventional
additive probability estimate of what may happen. This probability estimate is repre-
sented by the probability distribution . The presence of ambiguity, however, causes
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the investors to have restricted condence in the validity of this probability estimate.
The level of condence in the probability estimate is denoted by , where  = 1 denotes
full condence. In the case of  = 0 the investor has no condence in his probability
estimate whatsoever; he thinks that anything may happen.
The nal element of the investor's beliefs is represented by the additive partition of
the state space. This partition captures the notion that investors may consider some
aspects of the uncertainty they face to be best represented by calculable risk, while they
may experience ambiguity with respect to other aspects. The components FH and FL
being `additive' as indicated above means that the investor has full condence in the
probabilities he assigns to the events FH and FL, but fails to have full condence in
their sub-events and appropriate combinations thereof. The interpretation is that the
investor faces risk with respect to his prospective individual liquidity needs, but faces
ambiguity with respect to the signal and the return of the asset. Thus, investors' beliefs
are represented by (E)llsberg-capacities as in Eichberger and Kelsey (1999, [9]). See also
Chateauneuf et al. (2007, [4]).
2.3. Updating ambiguous beliefs. The updating of ambiguous beliefs diers from
the updating of additive ones. In particular, there is a number of competing natural
generalizations of Bayes' rule to the context with ambiguity. The rst generalization
that comes to mind when ambiguity is represented by belief functions is Full Bayesian
updating as described in Jaray (1992, [23]). This rule is best understood by considering
the set of probability distributions that provides an equivalent representation of the
belief function. In this setting, the Full Bayesian update is obtained by updating each of
these probability distributions separately. Since the set of (multiple prior representations
of) belief functions is closed under Full Bayesian updating, the updated set of priors
once again represents a belief function.
The problem with this Full Bayesian updating is that in the context of our applica-
tion the initial belief functions are arrived at using the axiomatic approach to Choquet
expected utility as in Schmeidler (1982/89, [27]) and Gilboa (1987, [15]). In this ap-
proach the beliefs are represented by a capacity, which not only represents the ambiguity
faced by the decision maker, but at the same time includes the decision maker's am-
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biguity attitude. Therefore, in using Full Bayesian updating, one would simultaneously
update the ambiguous beliefs and the ambiguity attitude. Since the ambiguity attitude
is best considered to be an individual characteristic of the decision maker { rather than
a components of their beliefs { the implied updating of the ambiguity attitude would
be inappropriate.
In the context of dynamic preferences that result from updating, Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1993, [16]) address this problem by providing an axiomatization of updating rules.
Their analysis is based on the same fundamental concepts | i.e. preference relations
| that were used to derive the Choquet expected utility representation in the rst
place. They formulate `reasonable' properties which a combination of dynamic prefer-
ences should satisfy. In the context of cautious/pessimistic decision makers they arrive
at the Dempster-Shafer rule (see Dempster, 1968, [5], and Shafer 1976, [28]) as a plau-
sible rule for updating. In the context of exuberant/optimistic decision makers, they
arrive at Bayes' rule for updating capacities.
When applied to the multiple priors representation of belief functions, the Dempster-
Shafer rule is a `maximum likelihood' rule. It restricts attention to those probability
distributions in the initial set of priors for which the received signal had the highest
probability. The set of updated priors is now obtained as the set of Bayesian updates
of these `maximum likelihood' priors. The updating results in another belief function.
In our setting, the Full Bayesian update of the E-capacity and the Dempster-Shafer
update of the E-capacity (which are also E-capacities) are identical. Therefore both
interpretations of the capacity | describing ambiguity per se or describing the combi-
nation of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion | are consistent with our model.
Applying the result of Eichberger and Kelsey (1999, [9]) regarding the updating of
E-capacities to our setting, we nd that updating the ambiguous beliefs leads to:
 Bayesian updating of the probability distribution ;
 an endogenous decrease in the level of condence:  < .
Updating the E-capacity (; fFg2fH;Lg; ) after receiving the information  for
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 2 (0; 1) one obtains the E-capacity (; fF  g2fH;Lg; ) with
(; b) (; g)
h

+"
1
   b
1 g =  
(+")
1 (1 (+")) ( )   g1 b =  
(1 (+"))
1 (+") ( )
F  ff(; b; h); (; b; `)gg ff(; g; h); (; g; `)gg
2.4. Preferences. The basic rational for the subjective expected utility approach
is to describe beliefs separately from the evaluation of outcomes if and when they are
attained. The beliefs typically relate to the likelihood with which certain outcomes or
states of nature are expected to occur. The evaluation of outcomes normally takes place
by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index or | e.g. in the case of prospect theory
| by a value function. In order to represent standard preference relations, the beliefs
and the evaluation of outcomes are combined through an evaluation functional, e.g. by
taking the expected value.
In the Choquet expected utility approach, a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index
is applied for the evaluation of outcomes if and when they occur. The combination of
the ambiguous beliefs and the ambiguity attitude of the decision maker are described by
a non-additive probability distribution called a capacity. The Choquet integral is used
to evaluate the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index over such capacity. Since it is
our purpose to analyse the impact of the level of ambiguity, rather than the impact of
the ambiguity attitude, we assume throughout the paper that in the face of ambiguity
decision makers have a constant ambiguity attitude of full pessimism.
To obtain a clear separation of the eects of risk from the eects of ambiguity,
we assume investors are risk neutral. For an investor of (ad interim) liquidity type
 2 fH;Lg we have the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index
u(x1(); x2(; %); ) =   x1() + x2(; %)
where H > L > 1 reects the intensity of the investor's preference for liquidity at
t = 1.
An investor derives ex-ante utility from a state contingent income bundle
x := (x1(); x

2(; %))(;;%)2fH;Lgfb;ggfh;lg:
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The minimal utility obtained for liquidity preference  within the additive component
F, given the type contingent income x
(; %) := (x1(); x

2(; %)); is denoted by
m(x) := min
(;;%)2F
u(x (; %); ) = min
(;%)2fb;ggfh;`g
u(x(; %); ):
The investor's ex-ante Choquet expected utility function over a state contingent
income bundle x for beliefs (; fFg2fH;Lg; ) is now obtained as
U(x) :=   E(;;%)fu(x(; %); )g+ (1  )  Efm(x)g:
2.5. Indirect Utility Representations. When looking for graphical illustrations
of ex-ante decision problems in a two dimensional diagram, one runs into obvious prob-
lems depicting investors' indierence curves. We circumvent these problems by using an
indirect utility representation. This representation is based on type dependent income
in terms of ex-ante money holdings and ex-ante investments.
In particular, for given fractions of money holdings  and investments 1   ; we
consider yH :=

H
and yL :=
1 
L
; where H := H and L := L denote the population
fractions of H type investors and L type investors respectively. This enables us to
depict the feasible combinations as a `budget line' in a (yH ; yL) diagram, independent
of the institutional framework under consideration. To complete the illustration in
the two dimensional diagram all we need is the appropriate counterpart of indierence
curves.
For this purpose we consider indierence curves of the indirect utility functions V;
which evaluate the outcomes obtained under the dierent institutional framework for
various combinations (yH ; yL). For some of the institutional settings, we may nd that
there are dierent ways to dene the associated indirect utility function V for out-of-
equilibrium combinations (yH ; yL): Therefore, the indirect utility functions require the
specication of assumed out-of-equilibrium reactions.
Once these indirect utility functions are arrived at, one can depict the decision
problem associated with dierent institutional settings within a single diagram. In
particular, such diagram reveals whether dierent institutional settings lead to the same
aggregate equilibrium money holdings and investments. But even if the equilibrium
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money holdings and investments are the identical for two institutional settings, they
may lead to dierent ex-ante utility levels for the investors.
2.6. Assumptions on Parameter Values. In the remainder of this paper, the
following simplifying assumptions regarding the parameter values apply:
1. ; " > 0 and  + " < 1:
The assessed probability of each of the asset states (b; h); (b:`) and (g; h) exceeds
zero.
2. ` = 0:
The asset return in the case of failure is zero.
3. H > h > L:
From the ad interim perspective and assumming the asset is successful, H types
would have preferred holding their initial wealth as money, but L types would
have preferred investing in the illiquid asset.
4. 1  H < CE%f%jbg.
Ad interim, H-type investors prefer the asset to mature, even after receiving a bad
signal regarding the assets' prospects.
5. b := E%f%jbg < L:
This ensures that the aggregate fractional money holdings b() are not second
best ecient (see Theorem 1 below). For each level of condence  we have
L > eb := CE%f%jbg:
3. Second-Best Efficiency
As a point of reference we consider second best eciency. The results of any nancial
system based on voluntary participation cannot be worse than self suciency. Neither
can it outperform the second best ecient outcome. In particular, we analyze the ex-
ante second best ecient liquidity allocation. This can be visualized by a social planner
who maximizes the ex-ante utility of the ex-ante (at t = 0) identical investors. Since
the presence of ambiguity leads to dynamic inconsistency in the updating of investors'
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beliefs, one must distinguish between the ex-ante beliefs used to evaluate the outcomes
at t = 0 and the updated beliefs which determine the investors' ad interim behaviour at
t = 1.
3.1. The Planer's Decision Problem. To determine a second-best ecient out-
come, a social planner oers an incentive compatible contract which maximizes the
ex-ante utility of the ex-ante (identical) investors. At t = 0, the planner decides which
fraction 1    of investors' wealth is invested in the illiquid assets. For each liquidity
type  2 fH;Lg at t = 1, the contract species payouts x1() at t = 1 which are
contingent on the public signal  2 fb; gg: Furthermore, payouts x2(; %) for t = 2 are
specied, contingent on both on the public signal  2 fb; gg at t = 1 and the return
status % 2 fh; `g of the illiquid asset at t = 2. Since the liquidity type of the individual
investors is private knowledge, the ex-ante utility is maximized subject to feasibility and
incentive constraints.
At t = 0, the planner decides for each signal  2 fb; gg the fraction () of assets
that will be liquidated at t = 1 and the fraction () of the money holdings that will
be transferred to t = 2. 2 The planner's decision problem now is:
max
(x1();x

2(;%))(;;%)2fH;Lgfb;ggfh;`g
;(();())2fb;gg
CE(;;%)

  x1() + x2(; %)
	
s.d. 8 2 fb; gg :
H  xH1 () + L  xL1 () = 1  ()  (1  ) + (1  ())   (F1)
H  xH2 (; h) + L  xL2 (; h) = ()  + h  (1  )  (1  ()) (F2h)
H  xH2 (; `) + L  xL2 (; `) = ()   (F2`)
H  xH1 () + CE%

xH2 (; %)j
	  H  xL1 () + CE% xL2 (; %)j	 (ICH)
L  xL1 () + CE%

xL2 (; %)j
	  L  xH1 () + CE% xH2 (; %)j	 (ICL).
For the objective function we have
2For the assumed parameter values, the optimal solution has ()  () = 0.
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CE(;;%)

  x1() + x2(; %)
	
=
X
(;;%)2fH;Lgfb;ggfh;`g
    [ %  [  x1() + x2(; %)]
+(1  )  min
(0;%0)2fb;ggfh;`g
[  x1(0) + x2(0; %0)] ] :
In Section 3:3 this problem is solved, but rst we take a closer look at the incentive
constraints at t = 1.
3.2. The Ad Interim Constrains. The constraints at t = 1 refer to the situation
after the planner made the investment decision at t = 0, investors learned their individ-
ual liquidity perference type  2 fH;Lg; and the economy received the signal  2 fb; gg:
Because of H > L > 1; it is optimal to payout the entire money holdings at t = 1, so
E(b) = E(g) = 0:
Due to the linear structure of the economy and since H > h, the rst best ecient
solution would be to hold the entire wealth of the economy as money and at t = 1
transfer the money to the investors with a high liquidity preference. So one would
intuitively expect that the second best ecient outcome is characterized by the largest
redistribution from L-types to H-types that still satises incentive compatibility { an
intuition that will be conrmed in Section 3:3.
For the aggregate fractional money holdings , denote y1() :=

H
and y2() :=
1 
L
.
Let
e := CE%f%jg =    =   h  h:
For  2 fb; gg denote by L() the fractional money holdings such that after signal
 is received, the interim incentive constraint (ICL) holds with equality if:
 the entire money holdings are paid out to H-types at t = 1 and
 the entire returns of the illiquid investments are paid out to L-types at t = 2.
That is, for the updated level of condence  and the type-contingent payouts
xH1 () = y1(

L(
)); xH2 (; %) = 0; x
L
1 () = 0, x
L
2 (; %) = %  y2(L()) we have
L  xH1 () = CE%

xL2 (; %)j
	
:
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After expanding the Choquet expected value, substituting out xH1 () and (x
L
2 (; h); x
L
2 (; `));
and rearranging terms, we obtain
() := 

L(
) =
H  e
L  L + H  e ;
where  denotes the ex-ante level of condence.
Since eb < eg; it follows that g() > b():
If for money holdings () signal  is received, the type-contingent payouts x
H
1 () =
y1(()); x
H
2 (; %) = 0; x
L
1 () = 0 and x
L
2 (; %) = %  y2(()) are optimal. Now we
determine the optimal type-contingent payouts for the case where money holdings and
signal b fail to match.
In case signal b is received for money holdings g(); paying out the entire money
holdings to H-types violates the incentive compatibility of investors with a low liquidity
preference. To restore incentive compatibility, L-types will need to receive some payout
at t = 1 over and above the entire returns of the illiquid investments at t = 2. Denoting
the fraction of the liquidity reserves at t = 1 that are paid out to L-types by b; we nd:
b = L  1  ebeg
!
= L 

1  
b
g
 bh

:
Next consider the opposite case with fractional money holdings b() and signal
g. Since g() > b(); the incentive constraint for L types, (ICgL), is satised if the
money holdings are paid out to H types at t = 1 and the returns of the illiquid assets
are paid out to L types at t = 2. The money holdings will be too low for this incentive
constraint to bind. Depending on the parameter values, the following three cases may
occur.
Firstly, the type-contingent payouts xH1 () = y1(()); x
H
2 (; %) = 0; x
L
1 () = 0
and xL2 (; %) = %  y2(()) satisfy the incentive constraint for H types, (ICgH), and
are optimal. Secondly, (ICgH) is violated but can best be restored by making payouts
to H types at t = 2, over and above giving them the entire money holdings at t = 1.
Finally, (ICgH) is violated and is optimally restored by liquidating some of the illiquid
assets at t = 1 and paying the revenue to the H types.
Denote the fraction of the asset holdings that is liquidated at t = 1 by  and the
fraction of the illiquid assets whose revenue is paid out to H types at t = 2 by b: By
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the assumptions of Section 2.6 we have  = 0. If (ICgH) is binding we have
b = H  1  H
L
 
b
g
 bh

:
3.3. The Ex-Ante Problem. After having analyzed the ad interim constraints we
turn our attention to the planner's ex-ante decision problem. The following theorem
conrms that the linear structure of the model allows us to focus on corner solutions.
Theorem 1. For the second best ecient outcome, there exists a level of condence bE 2
(0; 1) such that
E() :=
8<:
g() for  2 ( bE; 1]
any value in [g(); 1] for  = bE
1 for  2 [0; bE);
where
g() =
H  eg
L  L + H  eg = H  
  h
L  L + H    h
< 1:
From these optimal reserve holdings we obtain the second-best ecient contract
(xHE; xLE; E()) with for all (; %) 2 fb; gg  fh; `g :
xHE1 () :=
8><>:
1 for E() = 1
1 + L
H
 b
g
 bh

 E() for E() 6= 1 and  = b
E()
H
for E() 6= 1 and  = g
and xHE2 (; %) := 0, as well as
xLE1 () :=
8><>:
1 for E() = 1
1  b
g
 bh

 E() for E() 6= 1 and  = b
0 for E() 6= 1 and  = g
and
xLE2 (; %) :=
8><>:
0 for E() = 1
%  (1 E())L for E() 6= 1 and  = b
%  (1 E())L for E() 6= 1 and  = g:
is second-best ecient. This follows directly from Theorem 1 and the fraction of liquidity
reserves paid out to L types, b; as indicated above. Other contracts which obtain the
same ex-ante Choquet expected utility through an incentive compatible redistribution
of payouts at t = 2 are also second-best ecient.
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Figure 1: The Decision Problem of the Social Planner.
The planner's decision problem is illustrated in Figure 1.
The horizontal axis depicts the money holdings per type H investor, y1 := H ; the
investment in the asset per L type investor, y2 := 1 L ; is on the vertical axis. If all
money holdings are paid out to H types at t = 1, each of them receives y1: Similarly,
if the returns of the matured investment are paid out to L type investors, they each
receive %  y2 where % 2 fh; `g: Since ` = 0; we have xL2 (`) = 0:
The feasibility line denotes the combinations (y1; y2) the planner can obtain through
his ex-ante choice of money holdings and investments. The indierence curves relate to
the indirect ex-ante utility function VE; assuming that if incentives constraints are vio-
lated, incentive compatibility is eciently restored through appropriate redistributions
between H types and L types. The (ICbL)-curve denotes the combinations (y1; y2) for
which the incentive compatitibility constraint of the type L investors holds with equal-
ity after a bad signal is received. Similarly, the (ICgL)-curve denotes the combinations
(y1; y2) for which the incentive constraint of L types holds with equality after a good
signal.
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The indierence curves of VE have two kinks, one at the (ICbL)-curve and one
at (ICgL)-curve. The (IC

H)-curves do not aect the indierence curves since the re-
distribution needed to restore (ICH) only involves re-distriubution of income at t = 2:
Income at t = 2 enters the vNM utility index of both types of investors in the same way,
so such redistributions do not aect the ex-ante Choquet expected utility. We consider
three cases.
Firstly, to the left of the (ICbL)-line, the payouts of y1 to H types at t = 1 and
%  y2 to L types at t = 2 either are incentive compatible or can be made incentive
compatible by a redistribution of payouts at t = 2 from L types to H types that does
not aect the ex-ante utility of the investors. The slope of the indierence curves is
H
L
 H
hh =
H
L
 H
hh , so in this area the indierence curves are steeper than the
feasibility line whenever H > h  h:
Secondly, to the right of the (ICbL)-line but to the left of the (IC
g
L)-line, the payouts
of y1 to H types and %  y2 to L types are incentive compatible after a good signal.
But after a bad signal the incentive compatibility of type L investors is violated and
a redistribution from H types to L types is needed. The ecient redistribution is
to continue paying out all revenues from the illiquid asset at t = 2 to L types, but
to provide them with some of the money holdings at t = 1 too. As a consequence {
as is conrmed by Theorem 1 { the indierence curves between the (ICbL)-line and the
(ICgL)-line are steeper than the feasibility line, due to the assumptions in Section 2.6.
In the nal case, to the right of the (ICgL)-line, the incentive compatibility of the
L type investors is violated for both signals. After each signal, a redistribution from
H types to L types is needed. The ecient redistribution is to continue paying all
revenues from the illiquid asset at t = 2 to L types, but also providing them with some
of the money holding at t = 1. As follows from Theorem 1, in this area the indierence
curves have the same slope as the feasibility line if  = bE: For lower levels of condence,
the indierence curves are atter than the feasibility line.
In Figure 1, whenever the indierence curves are steeper than the feasibility line to
the left of (ICgL), but atter to the right of it, g() is the second best ecient level of
money holdings.
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The expression for g() in Theorem 1 indicates that for  > bE the second best
ecient money holdings fall when the level of condence decreases. So for suciently
large levels of condence, investment in the illiquid asset increases as the asset becomes
more ambiguous.
The intuition for this is as follows. The ad interim Choquet expected utility that
investors derive from the matured illiquid asset is  h h  y2, where a reduction in 
causes a reduction in the updated level of condence : For the incentive constraint for
L type investors to be satised, this reduction in  must be (partially) compensated
for by an increase in y2 :=
1 
L
; the only variable in the expression for the ad interim
Choquet expected utility. This requires an increase in 1  ; the fractional investment
in the illiquid asset.
Corollary 2. For any levels of condence  2 (bE; 1] and 0 2 (bE; ), we have E(0) <
E(y); i.e. a loss of condence in the asset returns reduces the overall money holdings.
4. Unregulated Financial Sector
The standard form of nancial intermediation in the provision of liquidity is by deposit
taking institutions, typically refered to as `banks'. We consider a competitive banking
sector with free entry in which banks have no equity. In the context of linear asset
returns and ex-ante identical investors as in our model, the competitive banking sector
can be represented by a single bank that operates under a zero (state contingent) prot
constraint and maximizes the ex-ante utility function of the investors. This competitive
banking sector represents the nancial sector of the economy.
4.1. Deposit contracts. A deposit contract (r1; r2;m) is a combination of promised
payouts of either r1 at t = 1, or r2 at t = 2; and fractional liquidity reserves m: The
deposit contract states that requests for the payout of r1 at t = 1 have priority over
later requests for payout at t = 2: When the requested payouts at t = 1 exceed the
bank's capacity for repayment, the available resources are distributed proportional to
the requests. The resulting eective payouts are denoted by (x1; x2).
The eective payouts are a function of the deposit contract (r1; r2;m); the aggretate
fractional withdrawals w at t = 1 and, in the case of x2; of the asset return status
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% 2 fh; `g: The zero (state contingent) prot condition allows for the eective payouts
to be represented by a combination (w; r;m); where r = r1: Here (r;m) is a short hand
for the deposit contract (r; h r(1 m)r m ;m): For fractional aggregate withdrawals w 2 [0; 1]
the implied eective payouts are
x1(w; r;m) :=
(
r if w 2 [0; m+1(1 m)
r
]
1
w
 [1 + (1  1) m] if w 2 [m+1(1 m)r ; 1]:
and
x2(w; %; r;m) : =8><>:
1
1 w  [m  w  r + %  (1 m)] if w 2 [0; mr ]
%
1 w  [1 +

1
1
  1

m  1
1
 w  r] if w 2 [m
r
; m+1(1 m)
r
]
0 if w 2 [m+1(1 m)
r
; 1]:
The eective payouts x1(w; ) x2(w; h; ) and x2(w; l; ) are depicted in Figure 2.
r
m
r
m+1(1 m)
r
1 w -
x1(w; )
r r
r
rr1
6
m
r
m+1(1 m)
r
1
h(1 m)
L
x2(w; h; )
x2(w; l; )
w -
r
r r
r
r
r2
6
Figure 2: Eective Payouts at t = 1 and t = 2:
4.2. Equilibrium in the Banking Sector. At t = 0 the representative bank oers
a deposit contract that maximizes the ex-ante Choquet expected utility of the (ex-ante
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identical) individual investors. The investors are assumed to have perfect foresight
regarding the aggregate withdrawal behaviour at t = 1: As each individual investor
is negligible, the aggregate withdrawal behaviour is assumed to be independent of the
investor's own behaviour. In particular, the dynamic inconsistency in the behaviour of
the other investors is known and anticipated, but the dynamic inconsistency of the own
behaviour is not. At t = 0; the ex-ante Choquet expected utility is maximized w.r.t.
the beliefs (; fFg2fH;Lg; ).
The decision problem of the representative bank is
max
(r;);$;($);($)
CE(;;%)fu(x($(; r; )); )g
s.t. 8 2 fb; gg :
$ := $(; r; ) 2 $(; r; ) (E)
$  x1($; ) = (1  ($))  + 1  ($)  (1  ) (F1)
(1 $)  x`2($; ) = ($)   (F2`)
(1  )  xh2($; ) = ($)  + h  (1  ($))  (1  ) (F2h).
Here $(; r; ) denotes the set of withdrawal equilibria for the deposit contract (r; )
when the signal  is obtained,  denotes the fraction of reserve holdings transfered from
t = 1 to t = 2; and  denotes the fraction of assets liquidated at t = 1: Constraint (E)
requires a withdrawal equilibrium; (F1) is the feasibility constraint for t = 1 and (F2h)
and (F2`) are the feasibility constraints for t = 2 if the asset returns status is h resp. `.
The formulation of the optimization problem assumes that at t = 1 the best possible
withdrawal equilibrium is obtained. This implies that banking panics (i.e. simultaneous
bank runs on all individual banks in the competitive banking sector) only occur if they
are the unique withdrawal equilibrium. Bank runs and banking panics that result from
coordination failures amongst the depositors are disregarded.
In solving the decision problem of the representative bank, we rst consider the
withdrawal equilibria $(; r; ) at t = 1: For this purpose it is assumed that at t = 0
all investors deposited their entire wealth in the bank.
Firstly, consider a deposit contract (r; ) such that the incentive constraint for the
L type investors is violated if all H types withdraw at t = 1: That is, if for the eective
payouts x1(H ; r; ) and x2(H ; %; r; ) we have
L  x1(H ; r; ) > CE% fx2(H ; %; r; )jg :
Liquidity Provision, Ambiguous Asset Returns and the Financial Crisis 24
All investors withdraw their deposits at t = 1, which results in run on the representative
bank. This banking panic is inevitable given the eective payouts of the deposit contract.
It is a fundamental run on the representative bank and, in the terminology of Freixas
and Rochet (2008, [14]), reects a fundamental banking panic.
Secondly, consider deposit contracts (r; ) such that after receiving signal  and for
assumed withdrawals $ = H the incentive constrains (IC

H) and (IC

L) are satised
for the eective payouts x1 and x2. In one of the withdrawal equilibria only type H
investors withdraw their deposits; another withdrawal equilibrium is a banking panic.
Finally, consider deposit contracts (r; ) such that after receiving signal  the incen-
tive compatiblity constraint of H type investors for the eective payouts is violated for
$ = H i.e.
H  x1(H ; r; ) < CE% fx2(H ; %; r; )jg :
In equilibrium some of the aected investors will now defer withdrawing until t = 2: As
a consequence, the representative bank must transfer some of its reserve holdings from
t = 1 to t = 2; which reduces the expected eective payouts at t = 2: As before, a second
withdrawal equilibrium is a banking panic, unless x1(1; r; ) < CE%fx2(1; %; r; )jg:
Now we have determined the relevant withdrawal equilibria, we consider the frac-
tional reserve holdings that solve the decision problem of the representative bank. This
requires a separate analysis of each of the above three possibilities for withdrawal equi-
librium for the signals b and g.
The decision problem of the representative bank is illustrated in Figure 3. The
feasibility line and the ad interim incentive constraints are the same as in Figure 1.
The case is depicted in which the (ICgH)-curve is to the left of the (IC
b
L)-curve. For the
solution of the decision problem, the area to the left of the (ICgH) in Figure 3 is not
relevant.
The case in which the (ICgH)-curve is to the right of the (IC
b
L)-curve is not depicted.
As before, the precise shape of the indierence curves in the area between the (ICgH)-
curve and the (ICbL)-curve is not relevant for the solution of the decision problem.
In Figure 3; the indierence curves of the representative bank are those of the indirect
ex-ante utility function V B, which is as follows. For an equilibrium in the competive
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Figure 3: The Decision Problem for the Representative Bank
banking sector, the ecient payout condition must be satised, which requires r1 =

H
and r2 = h  1 L . Now, in specifying the actions of the representative bank for `non-
equilibrium' reserve holdings, the promised payouts are assumed to remain r1 =

H
and
r2 = h  1 L ; even if they lead to banking panics that might have been prevented by
dierent promised repayments.
These assumed contracts for non-equilibrium reserve holdings lead to indierence
curves of V B as in Figure 3: To the right of the (ICgL)-curve, a fundamental banking
panic occurs after each signal  2 fb; gg; which leads to steep indierence curves. On
the (ICgL)-curve there will be no fundamental banking panic after a good signal, which
causes the indierence curve to `jump inward'.
Between the (ICgL)-curve and the (IC
b
L)-curve, there will be a banking panic after a
bad signal but not after a good signal. Therefore, the indierence curves in this area
are less steep than the ones to the right of the (ICgL)-curve. On and to the left of the
(ICbL)-curve there will be no banking panic after either signal. Therefore, on the (IC
b
L)-
curve the indierence curves once again `jump inward', with indierence curves being
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atter to the left of the (ICbL)-curve.
The following proposition results.
Proposition 3. For the equilibrium fractional reserve holdings we have
B() 2 fb(); g(); 1g:
As can be seen in Figure 3; a reduction in the level of condence aects the indif-
ference curves for the representative bank in two ways. Firstly, the ad interim incentive
constraints are rotated counter-clock-wise. Secondly, the indierence curves become
steeper. A reduction in the level of condence makes investement in the illiquid asset
less attractive, so a larger amount of the illiquid asset is needed to compensate for a
given reduction in reserve holdings.
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Figure 4: Comparision from Bank and Social Planner for  < 1
Figure 4 compares the decision problem of the representative bank with that of
the social planner. To the right of the (ICbL)-curve, the utility derived from aggregate
fractional reserve holdings  through the competitive banking sector is less than the
ex-ante utility achieved by the social planner for the same fractional money holdings.
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The reason is that the competitive banking sector has less possibilities for ad interim
redistribution between the two types of investors.
In his choice of contracts, the planner is only restricted by feasibility and incentive
compatibility constraints. When the incentive constraint for L type investors is violated
after signal ; the more extensive possibilities for redistribution available to the planner
come to bear. They result in a better liquidity allocation than the competitive banking
sector can provide. The deposit contracts oered in the competitive banking sector do
not give banks the opportunity to restore incentive compatibility by allowing L type
investors to withdraw some of their deposits at t = 1 without reducing their eective
payouts at t = 2: As a consequence, a fundamental banking panic and the results loss
of ex-ante utility are inevitable if (ICL) is violated.
Things are dierent if (ICH) is violated. In the case of `small' violations of the
incentive compatibility constraint of H type investors, incentive compatibility can be
restore by some of them deferring their withdrawal to t = 2: Some of the money holdings
at t = 1 must be transferred to t = 2. This leads to a reduction in the expected eective
payouts at t = 2, which may restore incentive compatibility. In Figure 4; the indierence
curves of the indirect ex-ante utility function V B would have a strictly convex shape
where this applies.
The violation of the incentive constraint for investors with a high liquidity preference
may, however, be such that it remains violated even if all type H investors withdraw
at t = 2: In the area of Figure 4 in which this arises, the indierence curves for the
representative bank are linear.
As is indicated in Theorem 1, under Assumption 5 of Section 2.6, the second best
ecient aggregate fractional money holding is either g() or 1: In this context equilibria
in the competitive banking sector with a fractional reserve holding of b() fail to be
second best ecient. But even if the fractional reserve holdings in the banking sector
are g(); the second best ecient liquidity allocation fails to be obtained. When a
bad signal regarding the prospects of the asset is received, a fundamental banking panic
occurs and the investments in the illiquid asset will be liquidated. By contrast, a social
planner would restore incentive compatilibity by allocating part of the money holdings
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at t = 1 to type L investors without reducing their payouts at t = 2:
This leads to the following result.
Theorem 4. Under the assumptions of Section 2.6, no deposit contract (r; ) with
 < 1 implements the second best ecient liquidity allocation.
As for second best ecient money holdings, a `small' reduction in the level of con-
dence leads to a decrease in money holdings and an increase in investments in the
illiquid asset. This is formalized in the following corollary.
Corollary 5. Let 0; 00 2 (bE; 1] be such that so, for some  2 fb; gg we have both
B(0) = (
0) and B(00) = (
00). Now
0 < 00 () B(0) < B(00):
5. Regulation
In a competive banking sector representing the nancial sector as above with  2 (bE; 1],
there are two possible reasons why the liquidity allocation may fail to be second-best
ecient. Firstly, the decision problem of the representative bank may be solved for
fractional reserve holdings b(); rather than for g(): But even if the reserve holdings
are at the second best ecient level g(); there will be a fundamental banking panic
| i.e. an unavoidable nancial crises | after the bad signal is received. This nancial
crisis leads to the inecient liquidation of illiquid assets.
A regulator can solve this second problem by restoring the incentive compatibility
constraint of type L investors after a bad signal. One way of doing this is by a revenue
neutral combination of taxes and subsidies at t = 1: Investors who withdraw their
deposits at t = 1 pay a tax, which is used at t = 1 to subsidize investors who do not
withdraw. For an appropriate combination of tax and subidies, the second-best liquidity
allocation is obtained.
The next question is how a regulator can address the inecient money holdings b().
In the absence of regulation dealing with nancial crises, minimum reserve requirements
fail to improve the liquidity allocation, as the equilibrium reserve holdings b() leads
to a higher ex-ante utility than g(): If this would not be the case, the nancial sector
would have chosen g() rather than b():
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There is, however, a more subtle solution to the problem. The regulator can credibly
announce to implement a policy of taxes and subsidies that ensures second-best ecient
contingent payouts whenever a bad signal is received for money holdings g(). This
policy is now taken into account by the nancial sector and by the investors, whose
decisions are based on the suitably adapted eective payouts. As a result, competi-
tion within the nancial sector leads to the deposit contract (
g()
H
; g()), which now
implements the second best ecient liquidity allocation.
At rst glance, it may seem that credibly announcing the `bail out policy' by the
regulator inappropriately creates a moral hazard problem. The policy `tempts' the nan-
cial sector to `carelessly' risk a nancial crisis after a bad signal, rather than `prudently'
ensuring no fundamental crisis can occur. `Greedy' investors are but too willing to play
along, as they can rely on the regulator to `bail them out' if and when a fundamental
nancial crisis occurs.
This impression, however, is misleading. In an unregulated nancial sector, crises
lead to the liquidation of assets, which can be very costly. Both the nancial sector and
investors may consider ineciently low reserve holdings that prevent crises to be the
`lesser evil'.
But in the presence of a credibly announced `bail out policy' a (potential) nancial
crisis no longer leads to the costly and inecient liquidation of assets. Therefore, the
nancial sector the no longer needs to choose the `lesser evil' of ineciently low reserve
holdings. It can increase reserve holdings to the level that is required for the second
best ecient redistribution at t = 1 of wealth from investors with a low preference for
liquidity to investors with a high liquidity preference.
The `bail out policy' of the regulator does not inappropriately create a moral hazard
problem, but rather provides an antidote to the ineciencies created by the deposit
contract's prioritizing of withdrawals at t = 1 over those at t = 2:
6. Failure to Recognize Ambiguity
The failure of the nancial sector to recognize the presence of ambiguity in investors'
beliefs can have severe consequences. Analyzing these consequences is the purpose of
this section. Strictly speaking, the question is outside the framework of the model and
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a thorough analysis would require a more general formal framework.
The construction of the imagined representative bank is based on the combination
of competition in the banking sector and perfect foresight by the investors. Under these
assumptions, the failure of the representative bank to recognize the presence of ambiguity
implies the failure of investors themselves to recognize presence of ambiguity. As long as
investors have perfect forsight and recognize the presence of ambiguity in the economy,
competition forces the banks to act accordingly, even if they do not agree. Therefore,
the failure of the nancial sector to recognize the presence of ambiguity violates the
internal logic of the model.
This being said, the issue itself seems to be of practical relevance and deserves con-
sideration in the context of this paper. The assumptions of the model | including the
representation of the nancial sector by a competitive banking sector { are abstractions
from reality. So even if some relevant issues are not fully covered by a model's internal
logic, the model can still shed some light on them. In particular, by providing a logi-
cally consistent benchmark, it can provide a starting point for economic thinking that
surpasses the model's boundaries. This approach to understanding economic issues is
the basis for the following analysis.
We start by assuming that the eective payouts (x1; x2) implied by the deposit
contract obtained in the competitive banking sector are exogenously guaranteed. Thus,
the beliefs of the investors do not correct the mistaken beliefs of the banks through the
competitive process.
We consider two ways in which the nancial sector may fail to recognize the presence
of ambiguity. The rst way basically assumes that the nancial sector is ambiguity
neutral. It ignores the presence of ambiguity and treat the probability estimate  as if
it was a (subjective) probability distribution held with full condence. Alternatively, it
may treat the weighting of the states of nature in the investors' ex-ante utility function
as a subjective probability estimate. Due to the presence of ambiguity, this implied
weighting diers from the probability estimate :
When the nancial sector shares investors' probabilty assessment but wrongly as-
sume a level of condence  = 1; it oers deposit contracts (r;m) = ((1)
H
; (1)):
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Since (1) > () the actual incentive constraint of type L investors will unexpect-
edly be violated when signal  occurs. The nancial sector will be confronted with a
(fundamental!) crisis it is unable to explain.
If a regulator is committed to the policy of taxes and subsidies as in Section 5, the
aggregate money holdings would be g(1) > g(): After either signal, a crisis would be
imminent and regulatory intervention would be required.
The second - more sophisticated - way in which the nancial sector may fail to recog-
nize the presence of ambiguity is by mis-interpreting the weights of the states of nature
in the investors' ex-ante utility function as a (subjective) probability distribution b. In
general settings with ambiguity, this will not lead to a unique probability distribution.
The weights change when dierent payout proles are considered that fail to be co-
monotonic, e.g. proles that obtain their worst case in dierent states of nature. But
for the payouts that occur in a competitive banking sector, the weights are consistent
with a unique (subjective) probability distribution b:
Consider a representative bank with reserve holdings bg(1) based on b: For the
implied eective payouts we have u(xH(g; %);H) > u(xH(b; %);H) and u(xL(g; h);L) >
u(xL(b; %);L) > u(xL(g; `);L). In the ex-ante utility function of the investors, this leads
to the following weighting of the states (; ; %):
b; h b; l g; h g; `
H H  (1   +   ( + ")) H    (1  ( + "))
L L     L    " L    (1  ( + ")) L  (1  )
These weights are consistent with the ones obtained for reserve holdings bb(1) and  = 1:
So the nancial sector's assumption that it is dealing with investors whose preferences
can be represented by a subjective expected utility function is not obviously proven
wrong.
Still, when interpreted as a probability distribution, these weights imply that the
probability of receiving a bad signal conditional on having a high liquidity preference,
 = H; diers from the probability of receiving a bad signal conditional on having a
low liquidity preference,  = L: This `pessimistic superstition' of the investors may raise
suspicion in the nancial sector, since it is not justied by the basic structure of liquidity
preference and asset returns.
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A more serious problem occurs when investors' ex-ante beliefs are updated at t = 1.
For this updating the Dempster-Shafer rule is used, which leads to the following ad
interim weights of the states of nature for an investor of type L :
b; h b; ` g; h g; `
L
  
  ( + ") + (1  )
  "+ (1  )
  ( + ") + (1  )
  (1  ( + "))
1    ( + ")
1  
1    ( + ")
Being unaware of the presence of ambiguity, the nancial sector updates the prob-
ability distribution b by using Bayes' rule. Regarding a type L investor this leads to
the updated probability distribution
b; h b; ` g; h g; `
L

 + "
"
 + "
  (1  ( + "))
1    ( + ")
1  
1    ( + ")
For aggregate fractional reserve holdings bg(1) the nancial sector anticipates a
fundamental crisis after a bad signal. After a bad signal, a fundamental crisis occurs on
the basis of the investors' actual beliefs. After a good signal, the weights assigned by the
update of b coincide with the weights that result for the ambiguous beliefs. The actual
incentive constraint of L types after a good signal equals the incentive constraint as
anticipated by the nancial sector. Therefore bg(1) = g() and it remains unnoticed
that the nancial sector is unaware of the presence of ambuity.
For money holdings bb(1); however, things are dierent. For the eective payouts of
the associated deposit contract we now have xL(g; h) = xL(b; h) > xL(g; `) = xL(b; `);
leading to the ex-ante weights
f(b; h); (g; h)g f(b; `); (g; `)g
H H
L L    (1  ") L  (1    (1  "))
which are consistent with the weights obtained for bg(1):
After the bad signal, the nancial sector nds that type L investors put an unex-
pectedly high weight on the state (b; `): The investors apply the Dempster-Shafer rule
to update their beliefs, resulting in an implied weight of "+(1 )
(+")+(1 ) , whereas the nan-
cial sector anticipates a weight of "
+"
: Therefore, the ad interim incentive constraint of
type L investors is violated and a fundamental crisis occurs.
This fundamental crisis takes the nancial sector by surprise. They assumed that
for their reserve holdings the incentive compatibility constraint of L types would be
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satised even after a bad signal. From the perspective of the nancial sector, the crisis
is caused by an `irrational overreaction' of the investors with a low liquidity preference,
who `lose their nerves' in the face of bad news. In reality, the nancial sector is facing a
fundamental crisis, caused by its own failure to recognize the presence of ambiguity in
investors' beliefs.
In an economy where the nancial sector fails to recognize ambiguity in investors'
beliefs, two types of regulatory policy come to mind. The rst is the conventional type
of policy suggested in Section 5 with appropriate levels of taxes and subsidies that reect
the presence of ambiguity. It leads to the second best ecient liquidity allocation even
if the nancial sector misinterpret the weightings in the ex-ante utility functions as
probabilities.
The second type of regulatory policy surpasses the nancial sector. It aims at cre-
ating an institutional framework which enhances the level of condence investors have
in their probability estimates. This requires measures that increase the stability and
transparency of the economy as a whole, including the predictability of (competent)
economic policy.
7. Concluding Remarks
7.1. Dynamic Inconsistency. The presence of ambiguity leads to dynamic incon-
sistency in investors' beliefs. After receiving non-conclusive information, decision makers
tend to deviate from the contingent course of action they initially planned.
This raises the question whether dynamic inconsistency should be regarded as an
inherent property of decision making under ambiguity or, alternatively, as an undesirable
artefact of the mathematical model used for the representation of ambiguity.
In the context of decisions made in the presence of ambiguity, Keynes (1937, [24],
pp. 114) states:
`How do we manage in such circumstances to behave in a manner which
saves our faces as rational, economic man? We have devised for the purpose
a variety of techniques, of which the most important are the three following:
(1) We assume that the present is a much more servicable guide to the
future than a candid examination of past experience would show it to have
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been hitherto. In other words, we largely ignore the prospect of future
changes about the actual character of which we know nothing.
(2) We assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices
and the character of existing output is based on a correct summing up of
future prospects, so that we can accept it as such unless and until something
new and relevant comes into the picture.
(3) Knowing that our own individual judgment is worthless, we endeavor
to fall back on the judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better
informed. That is, we endeavor to conform with the behavior of the majority
or the average. The psychology of a society of individuals each of whom is
endeavoring to copy others leads to what we may strictly term a conventional
judgment.'
This quotation | in particular the combination of points (1) and (2) | can be
taken as an indication that Keynes considers dynamic inconsistency to be an inherent
behavioural aspect of decision making under ambiguity. Keynes continues (Keynes,
1937, [24], pp. 114 - 115)
`Now a practical theory of the future [...] has certain marked charac-
teristics. In particular, being based on so imsy a foundation, it is subject
to sudden and violent changes. The practice of calmness and immobility,
of certainty and security, suddenly breaks down. New fears and hopes will,
without warning, take charge of human conduct. The forces of disillusion
may suddenly impose a new conventional basis of valuation. All the pretty,
polite techniques, made for a well-pannelled board room and a nicely reg-
ulated market, are liable to collapse. At all times vague panic fears and
equally vague and unreasoned hopes are not really lulled and lie but a little
way below the surface.'
providing further support for this view. From this perspective, approaches that nd
conditions under which dynamic inconsistency in updating beliefs under ambiguity fails
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to occur would be interpreted as identifying exceptional cases in which the basic mech-
anism fails to apply. For a discussion of these issues see e.g. Epstein and Le Breton
(1993, [11]), Hanany and Klibano (2009, [18]) and Siniscalchi (2009, [29]).
7.2. Policy Implications. Our model suggests that the second best ecient liq-
uidity allocation will be obtained by a nancial sector in which an appropriate regula-
tory policy is credibly announced and implemented. In the case of an imminent crisis,
the policy taxes withdrawals and uses the proceeds to subsidize to those who do not
withdrawing their deposits early. This policy has the theoretical advantage of being a
redistribution of resources at t = 1, not requiring the provision of additional funding or
liquidity from outside the model.
In reality, however, implementing such a policy on short notice may fail to be fea-
sible. It may be more promising to combat an imminent crisis by use of more exible
instruments. These could include the provision of additional liquidity by central banks
through lowering interest rates and by quantitative easing. They could also include
underwriting of `toxic assets' and the bailing out of distressed banks by governments.
The underwriting of `toxic assets' and bailing out of distressed banks reduces the
ambiguity regarding banks' ability to repay future withdrawals, increasing the (Cho-
quet) expected payout of these withdrawals. In the context of our model, this can be
interpreted as a subsidy to investors who leave their money in the bank. It helps to
restore the incentive compatitiblity for the investors with a low liquidity preference.
Similarly, ooding the market with liquidity allows more investors to take advantage
of favourable opportunities in the market, reducing the value of such opportunities and
thus reducing the value of liquidity to the investors with a low liquidity preference. In
the model, this is would be reected by either a decrease of L and H ; or by a tax
on withdrawals at t = 1: By making withdrawals at t = 1 less attractive, ooding the
market with liquidity helps restoring the incentive compatibility for type L investors.
Therefore, the combination of ooding the market with liquidity on the one hand
and underwriting toxic assets and bailing out distressed banks on the other, eectively
implements the proposed policy of taxes and subsidies by using the instruments readily
available to policy makers.
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A second type of regulatory policy would focus on reducing the level of ambigu-
ity faced by the investors, i.e. by increasing the level of condence. This requires a
broader based approach to economic policy which emphasizes stability, transparency
and predicatibility of economic policy measures. It resembles the kind of institutional
framework advocated by the `ordo-liberalism' of the `Freiburger Schule'. This approach
is at the heart of the `soziale Marktwirtschaft', the basis of the `Wirtschaftswunder' |
the German economic miracle in the 1950s and 1960s.
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